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Abstract
We use tools from evolutionary game theory to examine how power might influence the
cultural evolution of inequitable norms between discernible groups (such as gender or racial
groups) in a population of otherwise identical individuals. Similar extant models always
assume that power is homogeneous across a social group. As such, these models fail to
capture situations where individuals who are not themselves disempowered nonetheless end
up disadvantaged in bargaining scenarios by dint of their social group membership. Thus, we
assume that there is heterogeneity in the groups in that some individuals are more powerful
than others.
Our model shows that even when most individuals in two discernible sub-groups are
relevantly identical, powerful individuals can affect the social outcomes for their entire group;
this results in power by association for their in-group and a bargaining disadvantage for their
out-group. In addition, we observe scenarios like those described where individuals who are
more powerful will get less in a bargaining scenario because a convention has emerged
disadvantaging their social group.
1. Introduction
Not so long ago in America, it was a rule that black people sit in the back of the bus and
white people in the front. Today, women tend to be paid less than men, on average, for the
same work, even when the data is adjusted for external factors that may exacerbate such a
discrepancy.1 These are both cases where patterns of behaviour related to the division of
resources disadvantage those in one social group compared to those in another.
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1Moyser (2017) points out that when we consider annual earnings, women make $0.74 for every dollar
earned by men. However, this comparison is confounded by discrepancies in work hours between genders.
However, even accounting for this, women earn $0.87 for every dollar of their male counterparts. See also
Baker and Drolet (2010).
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In investigating such phenomena, economists have often employed the Nash demand
game—a simple, game-theoretic model intended to capture situations where two people
divide a resource (Nash, 1950). Some of the earliest work on this model showed how power
might play a pivotal role in determining who gets more and who gets less in a bargaining
scenario. In particular, under Nash’s influential axiomatic ‘bargaining solution’, an actor
with more power (we will say more shortly about what this means) is expected to get more
of a resource (Nash, 1953). This observation has been taken to inform inequities between
social groups like those just described. For example, applying the Nash bargaining game
to household bargaining, economists have argued that when women tend to be in a worse
economic position in the case of divorce (i.e., if bargaining over who does what in the
household fails), they should also be expected to do more work in the household (Manser
and Brown, 1980; McElroy and Horney, 1981).
In many cases, though, individuals who are personally powerful nonetheless end up
disadvantaged in bargaining scenarios by dint of belonging to oppressed social groups. In
the case of household bargaining, for example, it has been widely noted that even women with
earnings equal to or greater than their husbands tend to do more household labour (Horne
et al., 2017). This seems to be because divisions of resources are not determined solely
by bargains between individuals, but also by social conventions and norms—society-wide
patterns that specify which types of people get more and which less in various scenarios.2 To
understand these divisions, then, we need to look at the processes by which such conventions
and norms might emerge in human societies.
In this paper, we examine how power might influence the cultural evolution of inequitable
norms between discernible groups, such as gender or racial groups, in a population of oth-
erwise identical individuals. In this respect, our work extends that of Bruner and O’Connor
2We will say more later about what we mean by conventions and norms here. O’Connor (2018) discusses
the conventionality of inequitable divisions of resources at greater length.
2
(2017), who investigate this very question. Their models, though, always assume that power
is homogeneous across a social group—i.e., if women are disempowered with respect to
household bargaining, for example, then they are all disempowered and all in the same way.
This simplification means that their models fail to capture situations like the puzzling ones
just described—where individuals who are not themselves disempowered nonetheless end up
disadvantaged in bargaining scenarios by dint of their social group membership.
We use tools from evolutionary game theory to build agent-based models where members
of different social groups learn and culturally evolve to divide resources. We suppose that
there is heterogeneity in the groups in that some individuals are more powerful than others.
What we find is that even a single powerful member of a social group will make it more
likely that every member of that group ends up advantaged with respect to bargaining
conventions. Thus, our model shows that even when most individuals in two discernible
sub-groups are relevantly identical, powerful individuals can affect the social outcomes for
their entire group; this results in power by association for their in-group and a bargaining
disadvantage for their out-group. In addition, we observe scenarios like those described
where individuals who are more powerful will get less in a bargaining scenario because a
convention has emerged disadvantaging their social group. These models show that when
thinking about the effects of power on bargaining, it is crucial to consider not only the
impact of power on the positions of two bargainers, but also the impact of power on the
conventional positions of two social groups. As we point out in the conclusion, both aspects
seem relevant to the emergence of real-world bargains.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines relevant previous work in the field
and lays the technical groundwork for discussion of the models examined herein. Section 3
describes the current model in detail and presents original results with respect to bargaining
conventions and the cultural evolution of inequitable norms. Section 4 offers an interpreta-
tion and discusses the relevance of these results.
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2. Background and Previous Results
As mentioned, a standard way of modelling scenarios where individuals divide resources
is with a Nash demand game. This game involves two players who have some resource
to divide. Each player makes a demand as to how much of the resource she wants for
herself.3 Suppose, for example, that the resource available is of value 10. If the players
make compatible demands—i.e., demands whose sum is at most 10—then both players
receive exactly what they demanded. However, if their demands are incompatible—i.e., if
they sum to more than 10—then both players receive some poor, though possibly nonzero,
payoff called a disagreement point. The idea is that if players are jointly too aggressive,
they fail to come to an agreement on how to split the resource. We will say more about the
disagreement point concept below.
In the case where the resource is infinitely divisible, there exist for this game a continuum
of Nash equilibria—i.e., strategies where no player can switch and improve her payoff—where
the two demands sum to exactly the totality of the resource. To clarify, if have an infinitely
divisible 10-unit resource the Nash equilibria are comprised of every outcome where the
demands of the two players sum to 10. Notice that if either player demanded more at
such an outcome, the total demands would exceed the resource, so they would both get the
disagreement point. If either player demanded less, that player would simply get less.
2.1. Power, Bargaining, and Rational Choice
Nash (1950), working in the rational-choice based paradigm of classical game theory, pro-
posed an influential solution to this bargaining problem. Nash’s solution is based on four
axioms that he thought any solution should satisfy:
1. Pareto efficiency,
3Introduced by Nash (1950, 1953), the demand game may also be referred to as a Nash bargaining game,
Divide-the-Dollar, or Divide-the-Pie.
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2. Symmetry,
3. Invariance to affine transformations, and
4. Independence of irrelevant alternatives.4
Pareto efficiency is the condition that no player can make herself better off without making
her opponent worse off. That is we do not expect inefficient outcome where players leave be-
hind some of the resource. Symmetry states that if the players are indistinguishable, then the
solution should not discriminate between them—i.e., when the players’ positions are sym-
metric, their payoffs should be symmetric. As we will see, this condition is most relevant
to our discussion here. Invariance to affine transformations assumes that an affine transfor-
mation of the payoffs and disagreement point should not affect the outcome of bargaining.5
Finally, the independence of irrelevant alternatives (to be a bit hand-wavy) stipulates that
if a solution, x, is chosen from a set A, and there is some other set, B, such that x ∈ B ⊂ A,
then that solution must be chosen from the set B—i.e., any solutions in the set-theoretic
difference, A − B, are irrelevant to bargaining. We might say that if a bargain is made,
getting rid of some options that were not chosen should not change the bargain.
The solution derived from these axioms stipulates that for payoffs to the two players,
u1 and u2, and disagreement points d1 and d2, the players maximize (u1 − d1)(u2 − d2). In
other words the solution expects players to maximize the product of their payoffs minus the
disagreement point for each player. Notice that when the players have the same disagreement
points, this solution will yield equal payoffs.
Nash (1953) re-interpreted the disagreement point in these models to correspond to
an issued threat about what would happen should bargaining fail. This is the sense in
4Note, if we replace this axiom with the so-called “resource-monotonicity axiom” (which says that no
player should be strictly worse off from an increase in the available resource), this new set of axioms gives
rise to the Kalai–Smorodinsky bargaining solution. See Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975). See also Moulin
(2004).
5This sort of transformation involves multiplying all the payoffs for an individual by the same number,
or adding a constant to them, or both.
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which the disagreement point was first taken to correspond to the power of an individual
bargainer. Whoever has the ability to issue a more credible threat, based on their personal
situation, can lower their opponent’s disagreement point further and reap the benefits in
the subsequent bargain. Even without this threat interpretation, though, the disagreement
point captures something relevant about the power of an individual—those with more secure
fall-back positions are in a better, more powerful place with respect to bargaining in general.
They do not care as much about the bargain succeeding and can use this to their advantage.
For this reaons, in the models we present, we will operationalize power using differences in
disagreement points. This should not be taken as a claim that this is the only way to model
power, or the only type of power that matters to bargaining, or even the most important
one. It is simply one way to capture an aspect of what it means for bargainers to be more
or less powerful.
As briefly mentioned in the introduction, in the influential work of Manser and Brown
(1980) and McElroy and Horney (1981) (and many subsequent economists), household bar-
gaining is modelled using a Nash demand game.6 Household bargaining involves the division
of leisure and market or household labour within a household, subject to constraints of total
available time. These authors use the Nash solution to predict that women will do more
household labour.7 On their model, ui is interpreted as marital utility, which is itself a func-
tion of home and market goods and leisure time, and di is the disagreement point, which
is interpreted as payoff in the event of a divorce—i.e., the situation under which bargaining
breaks down. This disagreement point is a function of wage rates, household productivity
parameters, opportunities outside the marriage (such as remarriage), and other “extrahouse-
6These models supersede earlier “common preference” approaches to family economics that treat the
household as a ‘black box’, with income going in and leisure, goods, and children coming out. (See Samuelson
(1956) and Becker (1974, 1981).) These earlier models look at household bargaining as an issue of maximizing
social welfare and so cannot separate out (possibly disparate) individual utilities for the individual members
of the household.
7Note, this literature typically focuses on heterosexual households.
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hold environmental parameters” (McElroy, 1990). In this sense, individual assets—such as
personal wealth, property, or earning ability—determine one’s disagreement point insofar as
they are linked to one’s expected situation when on one’s own (Sen, 1982).
Lundberg (2008) suggests that there are several proximate causes of inequity in disagree-
ment points of this sort. These include the fact that women, in general, have lower market
wages than men, and so their post-divorce earnings are poorer; women often have primary
custodial responsibilities and so must share their earnings with children; and women tend to
have worse remarriage prospects relative to divorced men. As such, women’s disagreement
points are reduced significantly relative to the men’s.
Hence, on these models, rational choice predicts asymmetric household labour distribu-
tions between men and women in a domestic partnership. When men have higher disagree-
ment points this translates to more bargaining power, and thus to less household labour
and more leisure. From this point of view, we should expect that when both partners in
a household have an equal degree of bargaining power, they will divide household labour
evenly. That is to say, from a rational-choice perspective, symmetric bargaining positions
should result in symmetric bargaining outcomes. (In fact, remember that this was one of
Nash’s axioms.) However, as noted, empirical data shows that women tend to do more
household labour than men even when their market compensation is equal to or higher than
that of the male counterpart, contra predictions of the Nash model (Horne et al., 2017).8
2.2. Evolutionary Game Theory and the Emergence of Inequity
Evolutionary game theory, in contrast with classical game theory, looks at the emergence
or evolution of strategic behaviour on a group level, rather than at the level of the rational
8Several different models have been proposed to try to account for this discrepancy. We will not examine
these in detail here. See Lundberg and Pollak (1996) for an overview of several different economic models
of household bargaining in more detail. Several of these are also outlined by O’Connor (2018).
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choices of individuals.9 When it comes to the cultural emergence of bargaining behaviour in
particular, this framework has had a number of explanatory successes. For instance, Skyrms
(1994, 1996) uses an evolutionary model of actors playing the Nash demand game to explain
how a concept of “justice” might evolve. The state wherein an entire population always
demands half of a resource is evolutionarily stable—i.e., it cannot be invaded by a mutant
strategy. This “fair” division is the most common outcome in many evolutionary models.10
Thus we see why norms for justice and fairness might be so common in human societies.
These evolutionary models can also show how inequitable conventions and norms might
emerge in a group. Economists and philosophers of science have decisively demonstrated
how once a population is broken into social groups, equity is no longer the expected outcome
of such models.11 Instead, inequitable outcomes, where members of one group get more and
the other group less, tend to emerge endogenously. Since these types of models will form the
basis of the work discussed here, we will now describe them in detail and discuss relevant
results.
To investigate the evolutionary outcomes of bargaining, previous authors have looked
at simplified versions of the Nash demand game, as will we. Assume that the resource is
always of value 10. Assume that an individual can make one of three possible demands
corresponding to a low (L), medium (M), and high (H) amount of the resource, respectively.
Assume also that our medium demand corresponds to what we might call an equitable or
fair demand. In general, for a resource of value R, we have 0 ≤ L < R/2, M = R/2, and
R/2 < H ≤ R. Thus, in our case we have L < 5,M = 5, and H > 5. In addition, we
will assume that L and H are compatible in that they sum to 10 (1 and 9, or 4 and 6, for
9These models can be applied to either biological or cultural evolution. For example, there are clear
examples in nature where animals appear to play bargaining games. For example, in two-male stallion
(Equus caballus) coalitions something like a Nash demand game appears to be played to divide mating
successes (Feh, 1999).
10See also, Ellingsen (1997); Binmore (1998, 2005); Young (1993a); Alexander (2000).
11See Axtell et al. (2001); Poza et al. (2011, 011b); Gallo (2014); O’Connor (2017); O’Connor and Bruner
(2017); Rubin and O’Connor (2018); Bruner and O’Connor (2017); O’Connor (2018).
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example).
In this simplified three-demand Nash bargaining game with a resource of value 10, let
us represent the disagreement point for Players 1 and 2 as D and d, respectively. The
disagreement points, D and d, are what the players can expect to receive in case bargaining
breaks down. Complete information about this game is shown in Table 1. Each entry shows
the payoffs for a combination of strategies with player 1’s payoff listed first. Note that if
Player 2
L M H
L L,L L, 5 L,H
Player 1 M 5, L 5,5 D, d
H H,L D, d D, d
Table 1: Simplified Nash Demand Game for 10 Unit Resource
we only consider cases where D, d < L, this game has three Nash equilibria.12 These are
highlighted in bold in Table 1 and correspond to the situations in which Player 1 demands
low and Player 2 demands high, Player 1 demands high and Player 2 demands low, or both
players demand medium. As in the game with a continuum of strategies, demanding more
at any of these equilibria would lead to the disagreement point, and demanding less would
lead to less. As we will see, in our evolutionary models these three outcomes will be the
ones that emerge between social groups.
Besides the game, the other element of an evolutionary game-theoretic model is the
dynamics—a set of rules for determining how the strategies of actors in a population will
update. This typically occurs over time steps, such that, at each time step, the dynamics
determine how the population changes based on assumptions about how the actors learn
or evolve. The models we present use a dynamics employed by Axtell et al. (2001), who,
as noted, investigate the emergence of inequitable or discriminatory norms. Their model is
12We will only consider pure strategies—those where actors always take the same action rather than
probabilistically mixing—since these are the relevant ones for an evolutionary analysis.
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based upon previous evolutionary models of bargaining from Young (1993a,b). We focus on
the work of Axtell et al. (2001) since their version of the model is closest to our own.
Assume a finite population, consisting of N individuals. There are two sub-populations,
A and B, of discernible “types”. These represent identifiable social groups such as men and
women, or white and black people.13 Each population consists of nA and nB individuals
such that nA + nB = N . Following Axtell et al. (2001), we always consider models where
nA = nB, or the groups are equally sized.
14 On each round of play, two agents are chosen
to randomly interact with one another. They play the Nash demand game with possible
demands H, M , and L, as presented in Table 1. Further, each agent is equipped with a
finite memory of length m. An agent’s memory consists in the last m strategies that she has
encountered. On the basis of this each agent develops a belief—possibly inconsistent with
the actual state of the world—about what her opponent will do next time. She chooses her
strategy as a best response to this limited memory under the assumption that the probability
that her partner will demand H, M , or L is equivalent to the relative frequency of each of
these demands’ occurrences in her memory. As such, her response is a type of boundedly
rational best response to her past experiences. When she is indifferent between strategies,
she randomizes.15
Axtell et al. (2001) point out that when the agents are entirely symmetric—i.e., when
there are no subgroups—the equity norm, wherein every agent in the population demands
13For more on this modelling choice and on the fit between such models and real social categories like
gender and race see O’Connor (2018).
14Bruner (2017) shows, using slightly different models, that when nA 6= nB , inequitable norms can arise
against the minority population solely by dint of the fact that they are indeed a minority. O’Connor (2017)
shows that these results are robust under the type of dynamics described here, and O’Connor (2018) provides
an overview of these results. This is due to, what Bruner and O’Connor refer to as, the cultural red king
effect. This is similar to the red king effect in biology where slower evolving species can gain an adaptive
advantage over quickly evolving species (Bergstrom and Lachmann, 2003).
15Axtell et al. (2001) further assume that, with some small probability, , the agent chooses her strategy
at random. This small  may be understood as error or experimentation. The addition of an error-rate
makes the agents’ behaviour a “noisy” best reply to remembered past interactions. We will not include this
sort of stochasticity in our versions of these models.
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M , is the unique stochastically stable equilibrium (SSE) of the model.16 This result supports
the results of Skyrms (1994, 1996), Binmore (1998, 2005), etc., regarding the evolution of
fairness.17
Axtell et al. (2001) then test the model with subgroups, which they call “yellow” and
“blue”. In this version, agents maintain separate memories for what individuals in the two
different groups have done in the past, and they condition their behaviour dependent upon
whether they are paired with a member of their own group or a member of the other group.
As these authors observe, there are three equilibria that emerge between groups in this
model, corresponding to the three Nash equilibria of the underlying game. Either the two
groups demand medium of each other, one side demands high and the other low, or the first
side demands low and the other high.
They take these equilibria to represent the emergence of “norms” in their populations.
While these models are probably too simple to capture important relevant aspects of norma-
tive behaviour in humans, we do take them to be good representations of social conventions
in a similar sense to that outlined by Lewis (1969). We see patterns of behaviour that
improve social coordination, that are stable over time, and that are self-reinforcing—i.e.,
where no individual wants to switch what she is doing given what the group is doing. In
particular, notice that the two equilibria in these models where one side demands high and
one low can represent something like discriminatory conventions. Individuals treat in- and
out-group members differently, to the detriment of one group.
16The SSE concept was introduced by Foster and Young (1990). It makes a prediction for play of a game
by looking at where an evolutionary dynamics spends its time as the mutation rates in the population go
to 0.
17In spite of the fact that, asymptotically, the equity norm is significantly more likely than any other
outcome, Axtell et al. (2001) show that populations without subgroups may nonetheless spend a significant
amount of time in a “fractious” state, wherein some agents demand high and some demand low. This is
regardless of the fact that the fractious state is inefficient insofar as a different combination of demands
would result in the population being better off on average: The average expected payoff for this fractious
state is half of that of the equitable state. The point of their one-population model is that, in spite of the
fact that equity is probable in the long run, inefficient divisions may persist for significant periods of time.
They show that this waiting time is exponential in memory length and population size.
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It is by showing that these sorts of outcomes regularly arise in models with social groups
that previous authors have addressed the cultural emergence of inequitable norms and con-
ventions. In spite of the fact that their groups have no inherent social significance, and the
individuals in each group are otherwise identical, Axtell et al. (2001) find that some mean-
ingless difference in population type (yellow vs. blue) can give rise to inequity. Further,
these conventions arise because of an “accident of history” which becomes reinforced over
time. As such, over time the tags come to bear social significance, and the population is
divided into a class system that depends upon these (now) discriminatory tags. Since these
sorts of processes are self-reinforcing, such patterns continue in spite of the fact that they
are initially randomly established—i.e., they have no a priori justification.
The robustness of these outcomes has been widely verified. Under different choices of
dynamics and different population structures, groups of actors who are of different types,
play a Nash demand game, and update their strategies are commonly seen to evolve toward
this sort of inequitable arrangement (Poza et al., 011b; Gallo, 2014; Bruner, 2017; Bruner
and O’Connor, 2017; O’Connor, 2017; O’Connor and Bruner, 2017; Rubin and O’Connor,
2018).
2.3. Power, Bargaining, and Evolution
Bruner and O’Connor (2017) use a framework much like that employed by Axtell et al.
(2001) to investigate how power for one social group might lead to an advantage with
respect to the emergence of bargaining conventions. In particular, they frame their model
in the context of academic research where the two populations are asymmetric with respect
to bargaining power—e.g., junior professors bargaining with tenured professors, or graduate
students bargaining with faculty. However, the results are general to bargaining populations
with subgroups (O’Connor, 2018).
These authors operationalize power in several ways, including investigating the influence
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of disagreement points on the emergence of bargaining conventions.18 They suppose that
all members of one group have a disagreement point D, while the other have disagreement
point d. When D > d, this corresponds to individuals in the one population having more
bargaining power than the other insofar as these individuals have less to lose when bargaining
breaks down. They show that this addition of power to their model gives rise to a bargaining
advantage for individuals in the “powerful” population insofar as it is more likely that the
population evolves to a convention where the powerful group demands high.
Bruner and O’Connor (2017) focus on infinite population models using the replicator
dynamic—a very common dynamic from evolutionary game theory which supposes that
strategies yielding above average payoffs proliferate while those that yield below average
payoffs diminish and go extinct. In addition, Young (1993a) looks at models much like those
we will present here and proves that when two populations play the Nash demand game, the
unique SSE of the model is the Nash bargaining solution.19 In other words, power (as repre-
sented by disagreement points) translates to a bargaining advantage in evolutionary models
as well as rational-choice ones. Therefore, in both types of models, it pays to be powerful.
However, the reason is not the same: in the evolutionary models, the disagreement points
influence the population dynamics such that the predicted, population-wide equilibrium is
changed, whereas in the rational-choice models the disagreement points influence the actual
choices of individuals.
Both Bruner (2017) and Young (1993a) consider social groups that are homogeneous
with respect to power. One side has a lower disagreement point, and the other side has a
higher disagreement point. However, as noted in the introduction, real social groups are
heterogeneous with respect to power, in the sense used here. All women do not face the
18They also examine simulations of games wherein the players have different background payoffs, and
different outside options (resulting in a collaboration game).
19Binmore et al. (2003) expands these results different versions of best response dynamics and for some
coordination games.
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same, poor outcome if they divorce, neither do all men expect to be in a good situation. If we
think about segregated bus seating, while all black people could expect a negative outcome
from sitting in the front of the bus, a wealthy black person with an option to hire a lawyer
would be in a better situation than a poor person who could not afford representation. The
puzzle we address is to say why, despite this variability, we might see an entire social group
nonetheless disadvantaged. Previous evolutionary models do not yet settle this point.
In the next section, we turn to agent-based models very similar to those developed by
Axtell et al. (2001), but incorporating power differences between individuals, to investigate
how this variation influences the emergence of bargaining conventions.
3. The Model
We vary a number of parameters for these models, including population size, N , memory
length, m, and possible demands in the underlying game.20 For each combination of param-
eters examined, we ran 1000 trials and investigated which of the three equilibria described
above emerged.21 (These remember, were equal demands, one population always getting
more, or the other population always getting more.) At the outset of the simulation, agents
begin with no memories whatsoever, and they determine their first strategy using a coin
flip. Once the agents have at least one memory, they best respond to the memories that
they have.22 We consider two versions of the model. In the first, we add a small number of
powerful individuals to one of the two groups. In the second, we consider two groups where
20In particular, we look at population sizes, N = 10, 20, 40, 100, with sub-populations always equal (nA =
nB = N/2). We set the memory length m = 5, 10, 15, 20. And we examine possible demands given by
〈4, 5, 6〉, 〈3, 5, 7〉 and 〈2, 5, 8〉.
21We used 1.0 × 104, 3.5 × 104, 3.0 × 106, or 5.0 × 107 time steps, for the population sizes 10, 20, 40,
and 100, respectively. The increase in timescale was to ensure that every (or almost every) trial had
complete convergence to one or another equilibrium in order for us to meaningfully compare the results
across population size. Since there is no error-rate in our model, and so no error in the agents’ strategies,
the change in timescale does not make any difference here: once the populations reach some equilibrium,
they remain there forever.
22Axtell et al. (2001) begin with randomly initialized memories. O’Connor (2017) points out that, for
low values of L, more agents will, on average, begin by demanding high, whereas for high values of L, more
agents will, on average, begin by demanding low, when the memories are initially randomly implemented.
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disagreement points are drawn from distributions with different means. More details are
provided below.
Before discussing our results, we want to make clear how a higher disagreement point
might shift the dynamic in question. Suppose that our population consists of exactly two
individuals—called Player 1 and Player 2. This means that on each round of play these two
players meet and play the Nash demand game. Suppose that for our Nash demand game
L = 4, M = 5, and H = 6. Suppose also that the disagreement point for both players are
D and d respectively.
Further suppose, in our example, that some game-play has already taken place, with the
result that Player 1’s memory is 〈M,H,H,H〉 and Player 2’s memory is 〈L,L, L, L〉. Thus,
Player 2 has demanded H thrice and M once, and Player 1 has only demanded L—at least
as far as they remember. When D = d = 0, the normal best response for Player 1 will be to
demand low, since her expected payoff for this demand is 16, whereas her expected payoff
for M is 5, and for H is 0. Now suppose that the disagreement points differ. Let D = 4 and
d = 0. Player 1’s expected payoff for L is still 16; however, her expectations for demanding
M and H are now 17 and 16, respectively. Thus, her best response in this situation is now
to demand medium.
Let us examine this situation in more detail. The Players’ memories and their respective
payoffs for the situation in which D = d = 0 are given in Round 1 in Table 2. The players’
Memory Payoff (L,M,H)
Player 1 Player 2 Player 1 Player 2
Round 1 〈M,H,H,H〉 〈L,L, L, L〉 (16, 5, 0) (16, 20,24)
Round 2 〈H,H,H,H〉 〈L,L, L, L〉 (16, 0, 0) (16, 20,24)
Table 2: Example Game-Play with Disagreement Points D = d = 0
respective best responses based on their memories are the boldfaced payoffs. As such, Player
In this sense, the initial demands are skewed in one direction or the other. Hence why we implement our
memories in this way instead.
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1 demands L in round 1 and Player 2 demands H. They update their memories for Round
2. At this point, we see that their memories will never change (assuming no error), since
they have cemented a situation in which Player 1 always demands low and Player 2 always
demands high. This is a stable outcome.
Now, suppose again that D = 4 and d = 0. An example of one particular path this game
might take is shown in Table 3. The difference caused by the disagreement point in round 1
Memory Payoff (L,M,H)
Player 1 Player 2 Player 1 Player 2
Round 1 〈M,H,H,H〉 〈L,L, L, L〉 (16,17, 16) (16, 20,24)
Round 2 〈H,H,H,H〉 〈L,L, L,M〉 (16, 16, 16) (16, 17,18)
Round 3 〈H,H,H,H〉 〈L,L,M,H〉 (16, 16, 16) (16, 15, 12)
Round 4 〈H,H,H,L〉 〈L,M,H,H〉 (16, 17,18) (16, 10, 6)
Round 5 〈H,H,L, L〉 〈M,H,H,H〉 (16, 18,20) (16, 5, 0)
Round 6 〈H,L, L, L〉 〈H,H,H,H〉 (16, 19,22) (16, 0, 0)
Round 7 〈L,L, L, L〉 〈H,H,H,H〉 (16, 20,24) (16, 0, 0)
Table 3: Example Game-Play with Disagreement Point d = 4 for Player 1
is that medium, rather than low, is the best reply for Player 1. In Round 2, Player 1 is now
indifferent between her strategies and so randomizes, giving each strategy 1/3 probability.
Assume that she chooses H for her demand. Now, we have the exact same situation in
Round 3, except Player 2’s best response has shifted from H to L in light of Player 1’s
randomly chosen strategy from Round 2. Player 1 is still indifferent, so she randomizes
over her strategies again. Assume that she chooses H. After Round 4, the game moves
deterministically to its stable outcome shown in Round 7. Note that this outcome is the
opposite of the convention that arose from game-play in Table 2.
This outcome is not determined, since there is an element of stochasticity in Rounds 2
and 3. However, in our example from Table 2, the outcome was determined. Changing the
disagreement point, in this case, made possible an outcome that was previously impossible,
and that greatly advantaged the more powerful player.
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3.1. A Few Powerful Individuals
For the first models we consider, we set the disagreement point d = 0 for population A. The
disagreement point for most of population B is also 0; however, a small handful of individuals
in population B have disagreement point D, which ranges from 0 to L + 0.5 in intervals of
0.5. (As such, the group itself is not uniformly powerful—most members are identical to the
less powerful group.) The two sub-populations are otherwise entirely symmetric.
The main question we are concerned with here is whether a small portion of powerful
individuals, perhaps even just one, having a higher disagreement point will affect the out-
comes for both of the populations. In every case, what we find is that when D is zero, all
members of both populations are in a symmetric position as regards bargaining, and as a
result the portion of the runs that end in inequitable norms for population B is effectively
equivalent to those that end in inequitable norms for population A. As D increases, though,
it is always the case that the group containing powerful members becomes increasingly likely
to discriminate and increasingly unlikely to be discriminated against as a result.
Figure 1 shows this effect for a population with 10 members with m = 10, and with one
single powerful individual. For this, and all the results we will display, the possible demands
were 4, 5, and 6. As is evident, two things happen when D increases. First, there are more
outcomes where the population with the powerful individual demands High. And second, it
becomes increasingly unlikely that the group with the powerful individual will ever demand
Low. While alterations to m (the memory length) slightly alter the results, in general they
hold across parameter values.
What is driving this result? Members of group A regularly have to interact with the
single powerful individual. However, from the point of view of the individuals in population
A, the individuals in B are all similar. That is to say, an individual in A who is paired with
an individual in B does not know whether that individual’s disagreement point is higher.
Thus, individuals in A learn to bargain as though the individual with whom they are playing
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Figure 1: Bargaining outcomes in a population where N = 10 as the disagreement point for one powerful
individual increases, m = 10.
with has a higher disagreement point, regardless of whether or not this is true in fact. As
such, they play as if all individuals in population B do have a higher disagreement point.
Thus, it is as if all individuals in B did have a higher disagreement point.
The remarkable thing about this result is that an entire social group tends to end up in
a disadvantaged state as a single individual in the population gains power. The prediction,
contra bargaining models grounded in the Nash solution, is that individuals with equal levels
of power will often end up at bargaining outcomes where one gets more of a resource due to
group level norms. And, in particular, the models predict that power does matter to these
outcomes, but in a way that is quite different from in rational choice models. It is the power
of social groups that matters here, rather than the individual positions of those involved in
a bargain.
This effect of adding one powerful individual is less strong for a larger population for
the simple reason that the powerful individual now makes up a smaller proportion of the
total group. Suppose that we make a proportionally similar change though, by adding four
powerful individuals to one group in a population where N = 40. Figure 2 shows these
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results. The trends observed are stronger than before, so that it becomes very likely the
powerful group will demand high at the emerging convention, even though the vast majority
of them are identical to their counterpart group.23
The effect of adding a few powerful individuals is especially strong when we let D = 4
or 4.5. This is because, at these values, the powerful individuals are never incentivised to
demand low. When D = 4.5, in fact, demanding lower is never a best response for them. It
is thus unsurprising that the inclusion of these individuals in a group makes it unlikely for
the whole group to end up discriminated against. But notice that we see the effect for much
lower values of D. In other words, just a slightly asymmetric bargaining position, such that
it is still in the interest of the few powerful individuals to conform to any convention that
emerges, still leads to advantage for an entire social group by changing the best responses
of these individuals.24
23As these two figures make clear, when D = 0 for all individuals, larger populations are more likely
to head to the fair convention than smaller ones. This is due to combinatorics and probability differences
between larger and smaller populations. Suppose I am one of a population of 5. Then on a given round of
play, there is a 1/5 probability that I am selected to bargain. When I am chosen the first time, I randomize
over possible strategies—H, M , and L. Now, if I have one memory, I best respond to that memory. My best
response is going to depend on the probability that my opponent chose H, M , or L, which, in turn, is going
to depend on whether they were randomizing (likely at the outset) or best-responding to memories (more
likely later in the game). There are three possible values for this one memory, each of which will correspond
to a unique best response—H for L, M for M , and L for H. When I have two memories, however, 5/9
combinations of memory values have L for a best response; 1/3 combinations of memory values have M as
a best response, and 1/9 combinations of memory values have H as a best response. However, having two
memory-slots filled with values requires that I have been selected twice, and my being selected twice in any
given number of rounds depends inherently on the number of individuals in my population. To simplify
somewhat, suppose there are only three rounds to play and suppose that I am chosen to bargain on the third
round. When the population consists in 5 individuals in my subpopulation, there is only a 1/25 probability
that I was selected for both the previous two rounds, meaning there is a 24/25 probability that I was not.
However, if my subpopulation consists in 50 individuals, then there is only a 1/2500 probability that I was
selected in the previous two rounds (and so have two memories). Therefore, because it is more likely that, at
the outset, individuals will have more memories (i.e., will have been selected more frequently) and so will be
more likely to choose, e.g., a low strategy, it follows that their partner, who may not have any memories yet,
will be more likely to choose fill those memory slots with remembrances of opponents playing low, and thus
will be more likely to play high. Since this position is symmetric for every player when the disagreement
point is 0, it follows that we should expect less fair play with smaller populations, and so more fair play
with larger populations.
24Interestingly, when the population is large enough, and memory length long enough, we do sometimes
see conventions where an entire social group will demand low but for one powerful individual (D = 4.5)
who always demands high or medium. Because the other group always demands high, the entire population
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Figure 2: Bargaining outcomes in a population where N = 40 as the disagreement point for a few powerful
individuals increases, m = 10.
3.2. Heterogeneous Power
We also consider models where instead of one individual, or a small handful of individu-
als, having an unusually high level of power, one population is more powerful on average
with variation in both groups. This means that while one population tends to have higher
disagreement points and one lower, there are individual interactions that flip this dynamic.
Returning to the household bargaining example, these models capture a situation where
men tend to have better fall back positions upon divorce, and women worse, but where for
some marriages the woman is wealthier and more empowered than the man, and so does
better when household bargaining breaks down.
In particular, we assume that disagreement points are sampled from (nearly) normal
distributions, with mean 3 for the powerful group and mean 2 for the less powerful group.
These distributions are nearly normal because when a value greater than 4.5 or less than
0 is chosen, we re-sample. The standard deviation of these distributions determines how
much overlap there is between the two groups. When this value is very low, we approach
stays at the convention.
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a situation where the groups are homogeneous, one with a disagreement point of 3 and the
other 2. When the value is high, we approach a uniform distribution where the groups are
identical in terms of power.
We find that even in simulations where the power relationships between the groups are
much more ambiguous, power can advantage one group over another. While details vary
based on parameters, in general the effect was stronger for small standard deviations of
the distributions used to select disagreement points. It was generally weaker the larger the
population, because large populations tended more strongly towards fairness. And it was
weaker for longer memory lengths.
Figure 3 shows the effect for distributions with different standard deviations.25 As de-
scribed, when the two populations are more relevantly different the powerful one derives a
more notable advantage. But in all cases there will be outcomes where, due to the emergence
of group level conventions, more powerful individuals will receive low payoffs in bargains with
less powerful individuals.
4. Conclusion
From a rational-choice perspective, we have seen that when players are in symmetric posi-
tions, we expect bargaining to result in symmetric outcomes. However, this only captures
part of the story. In our first set of models, most of the individual bargaining situations—
i.e., on a given trial, when two individuals are picked at random—are symmetric. In our
second set of models, for some interactions either group will be more powerful. Nonetheless,
bargaining power by association has a discernible effect on the end results of bargaining sit-
uations at a global level. The group dynamics of our models suggest that the global effects
of power permeate throughout an entire group. As such, individuals in a disadvantaged
population are disadvantaged by dint of the fact that they are a part of that population.
25For this figure, N = 20 and m = 5.
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Figure 3: Bargaining outcomes in a population where N = 20 with heterogeneous disagreement points, as
the standard deviation increases.
Similarly, individuals in the group containing some powerful members are advantaged by
dint of the fact that they are associated with power. In this sense, they themselves are af-
forded a sort of de facto bargaining power. Because one of their in-group has actual power,
they come to have power by association.
The models presented here are simple and highly idealized. This means, of course, that
one must be careful in applying our results to complex real-world populations. It is clear
that they show how, in principle, processes of cultural evolution and learning can lead to
outcomes where individual power is less important than group membership in determining
resource division. Additionally, in capturing this phenomenon, they show how evolutionary
models of bargaining between groups can account for aspects of the real-world that rational
choice models generally do not. All this said, it is unlikely that real world populations evolve
bargaining conventions using anything particularly close to the processes we outline here.
Cultural evolution and human learning are vastly complicated processes. Inasmuch as we
can apply lessons from these models, it is largely in a ‘how-possibly’ way. We see how,
contra rational-choice predictions, such patterns of behaviour can emerge. This possibility
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does mean we should be attentive, in the real world to the chance that this sort of cultural
evolutionary process might be contributing to inequitable conventions and norms we may
wish to intervene on.
One advantage of the simplicity of these models is that they can be applied widely. We
capture a basic bargaining process which might represent salary negotiations, household
bargaining, division of tangible resources, or division of credit for co-authored academic
publications, for example. Our models do not include details that track the real differences
between social identity groups, so the models might be taken to apply to gender, class, race,
age, ethnicity—e.g., religion, spoken language, etc.—or any other discernible social grouping
(e.g., unions or employers). We understand bargaining power as a higher status quo for a
particular individual or group of individuals. In this context, a group has power whenever
the individuals in that group have less to lose when negotiations break down—a common
condition between such groups. In other words, the simplicity of our models adds some
strength to our results in that they can be applied widely to the processes by which groups
come to divide resources and the effects of power on this process.
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